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Abstract	
More	 than	any	other	 ‘Northern’	 country,	 the	United	States	 is	distinctive	 in	 the	degree	 to	
which	 its	 social,	 economic,	and	cultural	development	has	been	entwined	with	 the	global	
South	 from	 the	beginning:	and	we	 cannot	 adequately	understand	 the	 state	of	 crime	and	
punishment	in	the	US	without	taking	that	uniquely	‘Southern’	history	into	account.	In	this	
paper,	I	sketch	some	of	the	dimensions	of	one	crucial	reflection	of	that	Southern	legacy:	the	
extraordinary	 racial	 disparities	 in	 the	 experience	 of	 violent	 death	 between	 African‐
Americans	 and	 Whites.	 These	 disparities	 contribute	 substantially	 to	 radically	 different	
patterns	of	 life	 and	death	between	 the	 races,	 and	 constitute	 a	 genuine	 social	 and	public	
health	 emergency.	 But	 their	 structural	 roots	 remain	 largely	 unaddressed;	 and	 in	 some	
respects,	 the	prospects	 for	 seriously	 confronting	 these	 fundamental	 inequalities	may	be	
receding.	
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Introduction	
The	United	States	occupies	a	remarkable	and	complex	place	within	the	‘North/South’	dichotomy.	
As	one	of	the	richer,	and	certainly	most	globally	powerful,	of	the	advanced	industrial	societies,	it	
is	undeniably	part	of	the	‘North’.	And	the	reach	of	American	economic	(and	cultural)	influence	
arguably	shapes	the	world	social	order	more	than	any	other	‘Northern’	country.		
	
But	 the	 United	 States	 is	 also	 distinctive	 in	 the	 degree	 to	 which	 its	 development	 has	 been	
intricately	entwined	with	the	global	‘South’	from	the	beginning,	in	ways	that	are	more	intimate	
and	fundamental	than	in	other	advanced	industrial	societies.	As	Kerry	Carrington,	Russell	Hogg,	
and	Maximo	Sozzo	(2016:	5)	remind	us,	‘There	is	no	global	North	that	is	not	also	the	product	of	
centuries‐old	interactions	between	regions	and	cultures	spanning	the	globe’.	But	the	American	
experience	stands	out.	Many	Northern	countries	developed	colonial	regimes:	the	United	States	
incorporated	a	full‐fledged	plantation‐based	social	order	within	its	borders	from	the	start,	one	
that	 shared	 more	 in	 common	 with	 the	 slavery‐based	 societies	 of	 the	 wider	 Caribbean‐Latin	
American	 region	 than	 it	 did	 with	 the	 socio‐economic	 systems	 of	 other	 Northern	 countries.	
Migration	from	colonies	and	former	colonies	has	shaped	the	experience	of	crime	and	punishment	
significantly	 in	most	industrial	societies	of	the	North:	in	the	United	States,	the	most	important	
colony	was	internal,	and	massive	migration	from	that	internal	South	to	the	country’s	North	was	
one	of	the	defining	social	dynamics	of	the	last	hundred	years	(Wilkerson	2011).	We	cannot	begin	
to	grasp	either	the	nature	or	the	origins	of	America’s	outsized	problem	of	violent	crime	(or	of	
punishment)	 without	 placing	 that	 ‘Southern’	 legacy	 in	 the	 foreground.	 In	 a	 sense,	 it	 is	 the	
‘elephant	in	the	room’	in	discussions	of	violence	in	America:	a	looming	presence	that	everyone	is	
aware	of,	but	that	is	rarely	confronted	directly.	
		
Both	in	its	dimensions	and	in	many	of	its	central	characteristics,	the	American	problem	of	violent	
crime	looks	more	like	that	of	many	Third	World	countries	than	that	of	other	advanced	industrial	
nations.	In	this	paper,	I	explore	some	of	those	dimensions,	focusing	on	the	stunning	disparities	in	
levels	of	violent	death	and	injury	between	African‐American	and	white	populations.	I	emphasize	
that	 this	 focus	 reflects	only	one	 facet	of	 the	 ‘Southern’	effect	on	crime	and	punishment	 in	 the	
United	States.	The	country	shares	with	some	others	–	notably	Australia,	New	Zealand	and	Canada	
–	 a	 history	 of	 systematic	 and	 violent	 subordination	 of	 indigenous	 populations,	 and	 an	 ever‐
evolving	pattern	of	migration	from	a	wide	variety	of	‘Southern’	regions.	It	also,	unlike	most	other	
‘Northern’	countries,	has	a	 long	and	historically	porous	geographical	border	with	a	 ‘Southern’	
country:	Mexico.	Both	of	these	realities,	and	others,	help	to	shape	the	lineaments	of	crime	and	
punishment	in	the	United	States.	But	here	I	narrow	the	lens	to	the	present	state	of	violence	within	
African‐American	 communities,	 in	part	because	 that	 is	where	 the	 impact	 of	America’s	unique	
‘Southern‐ness’	appears	in	its	deadliest	and	most	catastrophic	form.		
	
Let	me	 acknowledge	 at	 the	 outset	 that	 some	might	 find	my	 characterization	 of	 this	 legacy	 as	
‘catastrophic’	to	be	both	somewhat	overwrought	and	perhaps	a	little	dangerous.	The	dominant	
view	of	the	state	of	violent	crime	in	the	United	States	in	the	mass	media,	and	even	among	many	
social	scientists,	has	lately	been	a	generally	celebratory	one.	The	‘story’	about	crime	in	America	
today	is	that	we	are	experiencing	‘historic	lows’	following	the	unprecedented	‘crime	drop’	that	
began	in	the	early	1990s.	In	contrast	to	the	1960s,	1970s	and	1980s,	‘crime	in	the	streets’	receded	
as	a	national	political	issue	in	the	early	years	of	the	twenty‐first	century	(cf.	Currie	2010),	only	
re‐emerging,	to	some	extent,	in	the	Presidential	contest	of	2016.	But	though	the	dialing‐down	of	
overheated	political	rhetoric	about	crime	is	surely	a	welcome	development,	the	recent	national	
complacency	about	crime	masks	the	continuing	concentration	of	staggeringly	high	levels	of	death,	
injury	 and	 suffering	 in	 many	 African‐American	 communities,	 and	 whitewashes	 stark	 racial	
disparities	in	the	experience	of	violence.	As	I	will	show,	these	differences	translate	into	radically	
divergent	patterns	of	life	and	death	between	the	races.	Our	tendency	to	gloss	over	these	realities	
helps	to	render	invisible	a	degree	of	collective	trauma	and	needless	suffering	that	represents	not	
only	a	demonstrably	avoidable	injustice	but	also	a	violation	of	fundamental	human	rights.		
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Our	tendency	to	accept	those	conditions	as	part	of	the	normal	backdrop	of	American	life	stands	
in	sharp	contrast	to	the	widespread	outrage	that	has	erupted	in	recent	years	over	a	spate	of	police	
killings	of	black	Americans,	especially	young	African‐American	men.	That	outrage	has	galvanized	
serious	 protest	 across	 the	 country	 and	 sparked	 a	movement	 built	 around	 the	 insistence	 that	
‘black	lives	matter’.	Yet	no	such	national	movement	has	emerged	in	protest	of	the	black	lives	lost	
to	routine,	non‐official	violence	in	neighborhoods	throughout	the	United	States.	
	
But	those	two	kinds	of	violence	–	the	unjustified	killings	of	black	Americans	by	police	and	the	
tragic	killings	of	black	Americans	mostly	by	each	other	–	are	two	sides	of	the	same	coin.	Both	
reflect	 the	 same	 underlying	 reality:	 the	 continuing	 state	 of	 marginalization	 and	 structural	
oppression	 faced	by	many	black	 communities	 today,	which	 is	 deeply	 rooted	 in	 the	peculiarly	
‘Southern’	 character	 of	 American	 social	 and	 economic	 development.	 We	 find	 it	 easier	 to	
comprehend	 that	connection	when	 it	comes	 to	one	side	of	 the	coin	–	 the	police	killings	–	and	
therefore	easier	to	condemn.	We	find	it	harder	to	make	the	connection	between	the	long	legacy	
of	systematic	racial	oppression	and	high	rates	of	violence	within	the	black	community.	When	the	
hand	that	holds	the	gun	that	kills	a	young	black	man	belongs	to	a	white	police	officer,	it	is	easy	to	
see	 the	 connection.	When	 that	 hand	 belongs	 to	 another	 young	 black	man,	 the	 connection	 is	
complex,	often	indirect,	and	consequently	harder	to	grasp.	And	because	we	find	it	harder	to	make	
that	connection	we	too	often	tend	to	accept	the	ongoing	social	disaster	of	violence	in	many	black	
communities	as	simply	part	of	the	American	landscape.	Others	of	us	may	be	troubled	by	it	but	–	
for	 reasons	 I	 will	 explore	 later	 –	 find	 it	 too	 perilous	 or	 too	 sensitive	 a	 subject	 to	 talk	 about	
honestly.	But	confronting	this	toxic	legacy	of	America’s	hybrid	history	is	essential	if	we	want	to	
put	an	end	to	a	level	of	communal	violence	that	has	no	counterpart	anywhere	else	in	the	global	
North.	
	
Violent	death	in	black	and	white	
Let	me	begin	with	some	numbers.	
	
Everyone	knows	that	several	countries	 in	West	Africa	were	recently	struck	by	an	epidemic	of	
Ebola,	one	of	 the	most	 frightening	and	deadliest	of	diseases;	an	epidemic	 that,	unsurprisingly,	
drew	an	enormous	amount	of	attention	and	concern	around	the	world.	And	the	world	drew	a	
deep	collective	breath	of	relief	when	the	epidemic	was	officially	declared	to	be	over,	or	nearly	
over,	in	2015.	According	to	the	World	Health	Organization,	something	over	11,000	people	died	in	
this	epidemic	in	the	hardest‐hit	countries:	Sierra	Leone,	Guinea	and	Liberia.	That	is	a	lot	of	people.	
It	is	also	less	than	18	months’	worth	of	homicide	deaths	among	African‐Americans	in	the	United	
States.		
	
From	the	start	of	the	twenty‐first	century	up	through	the	year	2014	–	that	is,	in	the	first	15	years	
of	the	new	century	–	almost	124,000	black	Americans	lost	their	lives	to	homicide	(Centers	for	
Disease	Control	and	Prevention	2016).	That	is	a	population	the	size	of	a	substantial	city,	larger	by	
several	thousand	than	the	total	population	of	the	city	of	Berkeley,	California,	where	I	live.	If	we	go	
back	just	a	little	farther	in	time	to	look	at	the	picture	over	the	last	20	years,	the	numbers	become	
even	more	astonishing.	From	1995	through	2014,	roughly	169,000	black	Americans	 lost	 their	
lives	to	homicide.	To	put	that	very	abstract	number	into	some	more	tangible	frame,	imagine	that	
we	had	lined	up	the	entire	population	of	a	medium‐sized	city	and	mowed	them	down	mercilessly,	
killing	 every	man,	 woman,	 and	 child:	 that	 is	 the	magnitude	 of	 the	 slow	massacre	 of	 African‐
Americans	 in	 the	past	 two	decades.	Keep	 in	mind	that	 those	20	years	were	years	of	generally	
declining	crime	in	the	United	States;	years	when	it	has	often	been	said	that	violent	crime	is	not	
the	problem	it	used	to	be.		
	
The	figure	of	about	124,000	deaths	since	the	start	of	the	twenty‐first	century	translates	into	a	
homicide	death	rate	 for	 the	African‐American	population	as	a	whole	of	 about	20	per	100,000	
people.	Again,	that	number,	by	itself,	doesn’t	mean	much	–	until	we	compare	it	with	the	rate	for	
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whites.	 For	white	 Americans	 –	more	 precisely,	 for	what	 our	 Census	 Bureau	 calls	 ‘white	 non‐
Hispanic’	Americans	–	the	rate	is	about	2.7	per	100,000.	That	means	that	the	overall	homicide	
death	rate	for	white	Americans	over	the	past	decade	and	a	half	has	averaged	about	one‐seventh	
that	of	black	Americans	(Centers	for	Disease	Control	and	Prevention	2016).		
	
That	disparity	may	seem	shocking	in	itself.	But	it	is	only	the	tip	of	the	iceberg.	The	connections	
between	race	and	violence	in	America	are	sufficiently	profound	that	they	overturn	some	of	our	
usual	expectations	about	violence	and	whom	it	strikes	most.	One	of	those	expectations	has	to	do	
with	gender;	another	has	to	do	with	age.		
	
Consider	gender	first.	 It	 is	a	truism	in	criminology	that	homicide	usually	strikes	men	far	more	
often	than	women,	and	that	is	particularly	true	in	societies	that,	like	the	United	States,	have	high	
rates	of	homicide	overall.	And	when	we	look	at	how	violent	death	has	played	out	in	recent	years	
within	 different	 racial	 groups,	 that	 truism	 holds,	 up	 to	 a	 point.	 Among	 those	 124,000	 black	
Americans	who	died	by	homicide	during	this	century	so	far,	about	105,000	–	85	per	cent	–	were	
male.	But	so	strong	is	the	effect	of	race	that	a	black	woman	has	more	than	half	again	the	chance	of	
dying	by	homicide	as	a	white	man.	For	younger	black	women,	the	situation	is	worse:	at	age	21	
years,	the	homicide	death	rate	for	black	women	is	double	the	rate	for	white	men.		
	
Now	 consider	 age.	 In	 the	 United	 States,	 as	 in	 most	 other	 societies	 that	 suffer	 high	 levels	 of	
violence,	it	is	the	young	who	suffer	it	the	most.	And	again,	that	relationship	holds	true	within	every	
racial	group	in	America.	More	than	half	of	all	homicide	deaths	among	black	men	in	America	take	
place	 among	 those	 aged	 18	 to	 30	 years.	 The	 person	with	 the	 greatest	 likelihood	 of	 dying	 by	
violence	in	the	United	States	today	is	a	21	year	old	black	man.	Among	whites,	it	is	a	26	year	old	
man.	So	age	matters,	and	it	matters	a	lot.	But	when	we	put	age	together	with	race,	this	usually	
very	predictable	relationship	is	disrupted.		
	
First	of	all,	even	though	it	is	young	men	who	are	most	likely	to	die	by	violence,	just	how	likely	they	
are	to	die	depends	overwhelmingly	on	their	race.	In	2014,	the	homicide	death	rate	among	male	
African‐American	21	year	olds	was	roughly	83	per	100,000,	which	is	a	rate	of	violent	death	higher	
than	that	of	any	country	in	the	world	except	Honduras.	The	rate	for	white,	non‐Hispanic	21	year	
olds	was	under	five	per	100,000	–	roughly	one‐seventeenth	the	black	rate.	Not	half	the	black	rate:	
not	one‐fourth	 the	black	rate:	one‐seventeenth	 the	black	rate	(Centers	 for	Disease	Control	and	
Prevention	2016;	United	Nations	2014).	
	
But	it	gets	worse.	As	I	said,	the	chance	that	a	man	will	die	of	homicide	generally	declines	with	age.	
It	starts	to	rise	 in	the	teens,	peaks	in	the	twenties	for	both	races,	and	then	begins	a	long	slide	
downward	as	they	go	into	middle	age	and	beyond.	But	once	again,	race	radically	complicates	the	
picture.	And	that	trajectory	can	be	seen,	to	be	sure,	within	both	races.	An	older	black	man	is	much	
less	likely	to	be	a	homicide	victim	than	a	black	youth	in	his	twenties.	But	a	60	year	old	black	man	
remains	more	than	twice	as	likely	to	suffer	a	violent	death	as	a	white	man	of	26	–	less	than	half	
his	age	–	the	age	of	highest	risk	for	white	men	in	America.	
	
What	makes	these	disparities	even	more	sobering	is	that	the	rates	of	violent	death	for	white	men	
in	the	United	States	are	themselves	quite	high	by	comparison	with	those	of	men	in	other	advanced	
industrial	societies	around	the	world.	Put	up	against	men	in,	say,	Japan	or	Hong	Kong	or	Germany,	
young	white	men	in	the	United	States	constitute	a	distinctly	vulnerable	group.	They	are	several	
times	more	 likely	 to	meet	a	violent	death	 than	men	of	all	 races	together	 in	many	countries	at	
comparable	levels	of	economic	development.	So	when	we	say	that	a	young	black	man	of	21	is	17	
times	more	likely	than	his	white	counterpart	to	be	murdered,	we	are	comparing	him	with	people	
whose	risk	of	being	murdered	is	itself	unusually	high	in	the	developed	world.		
	
And,	to	add	to	the	mix,	the	numbers	I	have	outlined	so	far	are	averages,	for	the	United	States	as	a	
whole.	In	many	American	states,	the	presence	of	violent	death	looms	especially	large.		
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In	the	state	of	Illinois,	the	homicide	death	rate	for	black	males	aged	15	to	29	was	132	per	100,000	
in	2014.	 In	Missouri,	 it	was	142	per	100,000.	Those	numbers,	again,	may	sound	technical	and	
bloodless.	But	the	take‐away	point	is	that	homicide	death	rates	that	high	are	unknown	anywhere	
on	the	planet	outside	of	some	of	the	most	violent	countries	of	the	global	South.	You	can	find	them	
in	some	parts	of	Central	America.	You	can	find	them	in	some	cities	in	Brazil.	You	can	find	them	in	
some	places	in	South	Africa.	You	will	not	find	them	in	any	other	advanced	industrial	society:	not	
even	close.	
	
What	this	tells	us	is	that	the	experience	of	violent	death	in	the	black	community	in	the	United	
States	is	very,	very	different	from	the	experience	among	whites.	That	difference	is	not	subtle,	and	
it	 is	not	 just	a	matter	of	degree.	We	are	 talking	about	a	 fundamental	division	 that	profoundly	
affects	the	quality	of	life	that	people	of	different	races	can	enjoy.	And,	again,	the	difference	does	
not	only	apply	to	young	black	men.	We	focus	on	them	the	most,	not	surprisingly,	since	their	level	
of	victimization	is	highest.	But	the	special	experience	of	violent	death	reaches	out	to	affect	groups	
we	may	not	 immediately	think	of	as	being	uniquely	vulnerable:	black	women	as	well	as	black	
men;	older	black	men	as	well	as	younger	black	men.		
	
We	can	see	those	divergent	realities	even	more	clearly	if	we	look	at	the	racial	disparities	in	violent	
death	through	some	other	lenses.	
	
For	example,	the	huge	differences	I	have	described	in	homicide	death	rates	mean	that	the	ranking	
of	causes	of	death	between	the	two	races	looks	remarkably	different.	People	die,	of	course,	for	all	
kinds	of	reasons.	But	the	way	in	which	those	reasons	line	up	tells	us	a	lot	about	the	kinds	of	lives	
that	different	groups	lead	and	the	kinds	of	risks	that	they	have	to	face	routinely.	Looking	at	the	
pattern	of	causes	of	death	–	what	people	most	often	die	of	–	provides	a	sort	of	dark	window	on	
some	very	basic	things	about	our	society,	and	about	the	human	meaning	of	racial	inequality	in	
particular.		
	
In	the	United	States,	homicide	becomes	the	leading	cause	of	death	for	black	males	by	age	15,	and	
continues	as	their	number	one	cause	of	death	through	age	35.	In	other	words,	during	every	one	
of	 those	years	 from	15	 to	35,	 the	 single	 thing	black	men	are	most	 likely	 to	die	of	 is	 violence.	
Homicide	is	never	the	leading	cause	of	death	for	non‐Hispanic	white	men	at	any	age.	It	rises	to	
fourth	place	for	white	males	for	a	while	during	early	childhood,	and	again	at	ages	15	to	24.	On	
average,	 for	 white	 men	 of	 all	 ages,	 homicide	 ranks	 nineteenth	 among	 causes	 of	 death.	
Considerably	fewer	white	men	die	of	homicide	than	die,	for	example,	from	aortic	aneurisms	or	
benign	 cancers.	 For	 black	 men	 overall,	 it	 is	 fifth,	 exceeded	 only	 by	 heart	 disease,	 cancer,	
unintentional	injuries,	and	stroke.	And,	again,	it	beats	out	all	other	causes	of	death	for	younger	
black	men	between	ages	15	and	35	(Centers	for	Disease	Control	and	Prevention	2016).		
	
And	when	we	say	that	homicide	is	the	leading	cause	of	death	among	those	black	young	men,	we	
are	not	saying	that	it	edges	out	other	causes:	we	are	saying	that	it	overwhelms	them.	At	age	21,	
homicide	accounts	for	almost	half	of	all	deaths	among	black	men.	More	21	year	old	black	men	die	
of	homicide	than	die	of	the	next	19	biggest	causes	of	death	combined.	By	contrast,	just	one	in	24	
white	men	that	age	dies	of	homicide.	And	once	again,	these	racial	disparities	are	so	large	and	so	
pervasive	that	they	bend	the	usual	expectations	about	gender	and	homicide.	Again,	only	about	
one	in	24	white	males	who	die	at	age	21	dies	by	violence,	but	almost	one	in	five	black	women	who	
die	at	that	age	suffer	a	violent	death.	
	
But	even	these	numbers	understate	the	impact	of	violent	death	in	many	black	communities.	One	
way	to	better	appreciate	that	impact	is	to	look	at	it	through	still	another	lens:	what	public	health	
researchers	call	‘years	of	potential	life	lost’,	or	YPLL.	YPLL	is	a	measure	of	how	much	premature	
death	results	from	some	particular	cause.	You	choose	an	endpoint	–	say,	age	65	years	–	and	ask	
how	many	years	are	lost	before	that	age	from	some	given	cause	of	death,	or	from	all	causes	put	
together.	So	YPLL	puts	together	two	important	factors:	how	widespread	the	cause	of	death	is	–	
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how	many	people	die	of	it	–	and	how	old	they	are	when	they	die.	Putting	the	two	together	provides	
another,	especially	revealing	window	on	how	death	plays	out	in	different	communities.	
	
In	the	United	States	today,	heart	disease	is	the	leading	single	cause	of	death:	that	is,	ultimately,	
more	people	die	of	it	than	of	any	other	cause.	But	it	is	not	the	leading	cause	of	years	of	potential	
life	 lost,	because	people	 tend	to	die	of	heart	disease	at	relatively	older	ages,	 thus	 losing	 fewer	
‘potential’	years	of	life	when	they	do	die.	Instead,	the	biggest	culprit	for	YPLL	is	what	public	health	
statisticians	call	‘unintentional	injuries’,	a	broad	category	that	includes	accidents	–	notably	motor	
vehicle	accidents	–	and	 ‘poisoning’,	which	 includes	drug	overdose	deaths.	And	 that	 is	because	
those	deaths	typically	happen	earlier	in	life.	
	
If	I	die	at	63	of	a	heart	attack,	then	I	have	lost	two	years	of	potential	life	before	age	65.	If	I	die	at	
age	15	years	in	a	car	accident,	I	have	lost	50	years	of	potential	life.	And	that	explains	why,	for	the	
population	as	a	whole,	unintentional	injuries	are	the	biggest	single	source	of	years	of	potential	
life	lost	before	age	65.	
	
And	this	measure	becomes	very	important	in	understanding	the	social	and	personal	burden	of	
violence	in	the	United	States	because,	like	accidents,	homicide	strikes	hardest	at	younger	people.	
Again,	the	highest	number	of	homicide	deaths	in	the	US	is	among	people	in	their	twenties.	And	
because	it	hits	people	younger,	the	impact	of	homicide	on	YPLL	is	much	greater	than	the	simple	
numbers	or	rates	of	death	by	homicide	–	bad	enough	in	themselves	–	would	suggest.	As	I	said,	
homicide	is	the	seventeenth	leading	cause	of	death	in	the	United	States	today.	But	it	is	the	sixth	
biggest	cause	of	years	of	life	lost	before	age	65.		
	
So	how	does	this	measure	look	when	we	compare	whites	and	blacks	in	the	United	States?		
	
For	black	men	overall,	homicide	is	the	leading	cause	of	years	of	life	lost	before	age	65.	For	whites,	
it	is	ninth.	One	out	of	every	six	years	of	life	that	black	men	lose	prematurely	before	age	65	is	lost	
to	violence.	For	white	men,	 that	 figure	 is	 less	 than	one	 in	50.	During	 the	 twenty‐first	 century,	
homicide	 has	 taken	more	 years	 of	 life	 from	African‐American	men	 than	 cancer,	 diabetes	 and	
stroke	combined.	The	difference	between	black	and	white	men	in	this	respect	is	so	great	that,	
even	though	black	men	make	up	a	far	smaller	proportion	of	the	male	population	in	the	United	
States	than	white	men	do,	they	collectively	lose	far	more	years	of	life	to	homicide	than	white	men.	
There	are	roughly	 five	 times	as	many	white	non‐Hispanic	men	 in	 the	American	population	as	
black	men.	But	black	men	as	a	group	lose	almost	three	times	as	many	years	of	life	to	homicide	as	
white	men	do	(Centers	for	Disease	Control	and	Prevention	2016).		
	
And	once	again,	the	racial	effect	on	years	of	life	lost	bends	the	usual	expectations	about	gender.	
As	I	have	said,	only	about	one	 in	50	years	of	 life	 lost	prematurely	among	white	men	is	 lost	 to	
violence.	 For	 black	women,	 the	 proportion	 is	 just	 about	 double	 that:	 one	 in	 25.	 Gender	 does	
indeed	make	a	big	difference,	up	to	a	point.	Black	women	lose	far	fewer	years	of	life	to	violence	
than	black	men	do.	But	race	upends	the	relationship.	Measured	this	way	–	by	how	many	years	of	
their	lives	it	steals	–	violence	looms	much	larger	in	the	lives	of	black	women	than	in	the	lives	of	
white	men.		
	
Let’s	step	back	from	the	numbers	and	ask	what	all	of	this	is	telling	us.	The	numbers	are	a	cold	and,	
in	many	ways,	 inadequate	 tool	when	we	 are	 trying	 to	understand	 something	 as	 complex	 and	
humanly	 significant	 as	 the	 impact	 of	 violence	 on	 the	 lives	 of	 individuals	 and	 the	 fabric	 of	
communities.	 But	what	we	 are	 seeing	here	 through	 the	 lens	 of	 YPLL	 is	 nothing	 less	 than	 the	
massive	 eradication	 of	 human	 potential:	 the	 elimination	 of	 human	 possibilities.	 It	 tells	 us	
something	more	than	the	simple	fact	that	violent	death	strikes	black	Americans	more	often.	It	
tells	us	that,	because	it	strikes	so	disproportionately	at	the	young,	it	erases	a	substantial	part	of	
the	future	of	an	entire	community.		
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A	neglected	emergency		
I	believe	that	these	numbers	constitute	the	metrics	of	an	ongoing	national	disaster.	But,	as	I’ve	
said,	that	disaster	and	the	deep	racial	divide	in	the	very	right	to	life	that	it	represents	remain,	to	
a	remarkable	degree,	mostly	a	taken‐for‐granted	backdrop	of	American	life.	
	
If	black	Americans	had	the	same	risk	of	violent	death	as	white	Americans,	we	would	have	saved	
almost	seven	out	of	every	eight	black	lives	lost	to	homicide	in	2014,	or	close	to	7,000	people.	Seen	
from	the	other	direction,	if	white	youth	had	the	same	risk	of	homicide	as	their	black	counterparts,	
there	would	have	been	roughly	13,000	white,	non‐Hispanic,	young	male	homicide	victims	that	
year,	instead	of	the	787	who	actually	died.	I	think	I	can	guarantee	you	that	if	that	many	young	
white	 American	men	 had	 been	murdered,	 there	would	 have	 been	 a	 huge	 outcry	 and	 a	 vocal	
demand	that	something	be	done.	Yet	the	violent	deaths	of	more	than	80,000	young	black	men	
over	 the	 past	 20	 years	 brought	 no	 such	 outrage,	much	 less	 an	 urgent	 and	 serious	 search	 for	
solutions.	
	
Why	not?	
	
Part	of	the	reason	may	be	that,	as	I	said	at	the	start,	it	is	genuinely	harder	for	most	people	to	grasp	
the	connection	between	this	kind	of	communal	violence	and	the	impact	of	generations	of	racial	
oppression.	It	is	a	complicated	idea	to	grasp	that	those	horrific	levels	of	deadly	violence	are	not	
just	the	result	of	bad	choices	by	a	handful	of	antisocial	individuals;	or	of	bad	family	upbringing	or	
the	noxious	influence	of	violent	movies	or	rap	lyrics;	or	the	leniency	of	the	courts.	It	is	harder	to	
wrap	our	minds	around	the	 idea	that	 these	 individual	acts	are	the	complex	and	often	indirect	
result	 of	 large	 social	 forces	 that	 we	 often	 cannot	 see:	 the	 result	 of	 generations	 of	 blasted	
opportunities,	of	stunted	chances,	of	bad	alternatives,	of	shrunken	possibilities	for	meaning	as	
well	as	for	work	and	a	decent	living.	But	those	connections	are	very	real.	There	is,	of	course,	a	
unique	story	behind	every	one	of	those	violent	deaths.	But	those	stories	do	not	exist	in	a	vacuum.	
They	are	set	in	particular	social	contexts.	And	those	contexts	are	often	quite	predictable.	
	
But	another	part	of	the	reason	why	our	society	tends	to	accept	high	levels	of	violent	death	in	the	
black	community,	I	suspect,	is	less	conceptual	and	more	political.	It	is	that	the	great	majority	of	
the	 people	 whose	 deaths	 are	 reflected	 in	 these	 statistics	 do	 not	 come	 from	 places	 with	 any	
significant	political	influence,	visibility	or	resources.	Outside	of	their	own	neighborhoods,	they	
are	literally	not	‘seen’	in	any	meaningful	sense.	Within	those	neighborhoods,	there	is	often	outrage	
and	anger	over	the	losses	they	have	had	to	live	with	for	so	long.	Outside	them,	not	so	much.	
	
The	places	that	suffer	the	worst	rates	of	violent	death	in	America	–	as	is	true	around	the	world	–	
are	 by	 now	 depressingly	 predicable.	 They	 are	 invariably	 places	 that	 have	 been	 especially	
devastated	by	the	harsh	underside	of	America’s	partly	 ‘Southern’	pattern	of	development.	The	
highest	urban	homicide	 rate	 in	2013	 in	 the	United	States	among	cities	of	reasonable	 size	was	
suffered	by	 the	city	of	Gary,	 Indiana,	where	 the	murder	rate	greatly	exceeds	 that	of	Kingston,	
Jamaica,	the	most	violent	city	in	one	of	the	world’s	most	perennially	violent	countries.	Gary	is	also	
a	stunningly	poor	and	heavily	African‐American	city.	Sixty	per	cent	of	its	children	are	in	poverty:	
it	has	recently	averaged	an	official	unemployment	rate	of	just	under	20	per	cent	–	about	four	times	
the	national	average	–	which	surely	greatly	underestimates	the	actual	number	of	people	without	
legitimate	work.	And	it	is	83	per	cent	black	(United	States	Census	Bureau	2016).	A	roughly	similar	
picture	holds	for	all	the	other	major	cities	that	consistently	experience	the	highest	homicide	rates	
in	 America:	 cities	 like	Newark,	 New	 Jersey;	 New	Orleans,	 Louisiana;	 Baltimore,	Maryland;	 St.	
Louis,	Missouri;	or	Detroit,	Michigan.	Poor	people	in	poor	cities	–	just	like	poor	people	in	poor	
countries	–	have	very	little	voice	and	very	little	visibility.	And	so	a	lot	of	what	happens	in	their	
lives	–	including	the	worst	as	well	as	the	best	–	flies	under	the	radar.		
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A	recent	survey	of	the	neighborhood	experiences	of	people	of	different	races	in	Chicago,	where	
homicides	and	gun	violence	generally	are	rising	sharply	as	I	write,	drives	this	point	home.	Eighty‐
six	per	cent	of	blacks,	versus	50	per	cent	of	whites,	said	that	 it	was	 ‘very	 likely’	or	 ‘somewhat	
likely’	that	a	young	person	in	their	neighborhood	would	be	a	victim	of	violent	crime;	and	81	per	
cent	of	blacks,	versus	41	per	cent	of	whites,	believed	that	it	was	either	‘very’	or	‘somewhat’	likely	
that	a	young	person	in	their	neighborhood	would	go	to	jail	(Davey	and	Russonello	2016).	And	the	
survey	also	highlights	black	residents’	deep	sense	of	political	marginalization	in	the	city:	only	8	
per	cent	believed	that	the	city’s	mayor	‘cared	a	lot’	about	people	like	them,	while	more	than	two‐
thirds	believed	that	he	cared	either	‘not	much’	or	‘not	at	all’.	
	
On	another	level,	I	think	that,	 for	a	variety	of	reasons,	it	 is	often	hard	for	people	outside	those	
communities	 to	 face	up	 to	 these	 issues,	 even	people	who	are	generally	 concerned	with	 social	
justice,	and	even	people	whose	job	it	is	to	study	violent	crime.	Part	of	the	problem	is	that	some	
people	are	paralyzed	by	the	worry	that,	if	we	call	attention	to	the	scope	of	violent	death	in	black	
communities,	 we	will	 be	 ‘pathologizing’	 those	 communities	 and	 feeding	 negative	 stereotypes	
about	people	of	color;	in	particular,	demonizing	the	young	men	who	are	both	the	most	frequent	
perpetrators	 of	 violence	 and	 its	 most	 frequent	 victims.	 The	 concern	 is	 understandable:	 the	
negative	stereotypes	about	blacks	and	crime	in	America	(as	in	many	other	countries)	are	very	
real,	 and	highlighting	 the	 troubles	 of	 those	 communities	without	 simultaneously	 emphasizing	
their	deeper	structural	roots	is	indeed	both	misleading	and	destructive.	But	so	is	ignoring	tough	
but	inescapable	realities.	You	cannot	do	anything	to	alleviate	a	human	tragedy	if	you	are	unwilling	
even	to	acknowledge	that	it	exists.	And	in	the	absence	of	action	based	on	being	willing	to	look	
those	realities	in	the	face,	people	keep	on	dying.	There	is	a	racism	of	exaggeration,	victim‐blaming	
and	malevolent	stereotyping,	but	there	is	also	a	racism	of	silence	and	a	racism	of	denial.		
	
This	look‐the‐other‐way	attitude,	unfortunately,	is	disturbingly	common	among	social	scientists.	
Some	of	the	people	whose	job	it	is	to	understand	this	problem	actively	deny	that	it	exists.	There	
has	been	a	resurgence	in	the	last	few	years,	perhaps	more	in	the	United	States	than	elsewhere,	of	
a	kind	of	scholarship	and	media	commentary	that	downplays,	or	dismisses,	the	significance	of	
violence	as	a	social	problem,	and	sometimes	suggests	that	the	plague	of	violence	in	many	African‐
American	 communities	 is	 largely	 a	 social	 construction	 (Murakawa	 2014).	 Some	 of	 this	
scholarship	 has	 been	 fairly	 good	 at	 describing	 the	 racial	 inequalities	 in	 our	 criminal	 justice	
system,	 and	 that	 is	 certainly	necessary	 and	 important.	 But	 in	 largely	 dismissing	 the	 idea	 that	
violence	is	a	real	problem	in	a	country	that	loses	roughly	8,000	African	American	lives	to	violence	
every	year,	this	perspective	comes	perilously	close	to	dismissing	the	people	who	suffer	from	it	
the	most:	perilously	close	to	suggesting	that	in	fact	those	lives	don’t	matter.		
	
One	result	of	the	failure	to	acknowledge	this	emergency	is	that	our	attention	is	shifted	away	from	
thinking	 about	 strategies	 that	 could	 confront	 head‐on	 the	 historical	 and	 structural	 roots	 of	
endemic	violence,	toward	relatively	peripheral,	if	well‐intentioned,	responses.	In	the	face	of	the	
recent	highly	visible	police	killings	of	black	Americans,	much	of	the	discussion	has	focused	on	
narrow	issues	of	police	reform:	whether	police	should	be	required	to	wear	body	cameras	more	
often;	or	take	sensitivity	training	to	become	more	aware	of	their	implicit	biases	against	people	of	
color;	or	develop	better	internal	mechanisms	for	disciplining	officers	who	behave	badly.		
	
I	 am	 not	 suggesting	 that	 these	measures	might	 not	 be	 useful.	 But	 they	 are	 a	 long	way	 from	
addressing	the	larger	structural	context	of	violent	death	in	the	black	community.	And	if	that	is	all	
we	think	about	doing,	we	are	not	being	serious.	That	lack	of	seriousness	represents	an	abdication;	
a	failure	of	the	moral	as	well	as	the	sociological	imagination.	
	
Confronting	the	‘Southern’	legacy		
If	we	really	want	to	show	that	we	believe	black	lives	matter,	we	have	to	fold	measures	that	are	
specifically	aimed	at	changing	police	practices	into	a	much	wider	strategy	of	tackling	the	sources	
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of	black	marginality	in	the	United	States.	Yet	to	an	important	degree,	the	kind	of	structural	and	
historical	 analysis	 that	 would	 make	 such	 a	 strategy	 possible	 has	 receded	 from	 the	 current	
discussion.	The	tendency	to	minimize	these	realities,	or	to	accept	them	as	a	taken–for‐granted	
part	of	the	American	landscape,	obscures	the	depth	and	historical	embeddedness	of	the	forces	
that	have	created	the	‘Third	World’	levels	of	violence	that	continue	to	plague	African‐American	
communities	in	the	age	of	the	‘great	American	crime	decline’.	And	it	obscures	the	degree	to	which	
those	forces	are	the	product	of	specific	choices:	choices	deliberately	made	or	heedlessly	not	made;	
choices	that	could	have	been	made	differently;	choices	that,	at	best,	have	failed	to	address	the	
special	needs	created	by	the	legacy	of	our	‘Southern’	pattern	of	development	and,	at	worst,	have	
actively	perpetuated	that	legacy.		
	
I	won’t	go	 into	detail	 about	 those	choices	here,	but	 the	historical	 record	 is	unambiguous.	The	
context	of	post‐Civil	War	communal	violence	in	the	black	communities	of	the	United	States	begins	
with	 the	 retreat	 of	 the	 federal	 government	 from	 its	 embryonic	 efforts	 at	 racially	 equitable	
economic	development	and	 land	reform	in	 the	era	of	Reconstruction.	That	enormously	 fateful	
choice	left	Southern	blacks	landless	and	without	stable	sources	of	livelihood,	and	rendered	them	
dependent	on	the	shifting	labor	needs	of	white	employers,	who	rapidly	restored	a	system	of	labor	
discipline	 and	 social	 subordination	 that	was	 remarkably	 akin	 to	pre‐Civil	War	 slavery	 (Foner	
2015).	That	retrogression	was	enforced	both	through	escalating	private	violence	by	whites	and	
through	the	development	of	a	criminal	justice	system	geared	explicitly	toward	mass	intimidation	
and	exploitation	of	the	African‐American	population	as	a	whole.	That	system	notably	included	the	
practice	 of	 convict	 leasing,	 through	 which	 local	 authorities	 routinely	 rounded	 up	 tens	 of	
thousands	of	blacks	on	vagrancy	charges	and	other	minor	and/or	vaguely	defined	offenses	and	
sold	 them	 to	 private	 employers	 to	 work	 off	 the	 resulting	 fines,	 a	 practice	 that,	 in	 turn,	 was	
passively	enabled	by	the	persistent	hands‐off	response	of	federal	authorities	(Blackmon	2009;	
Litwack	1999).		
	
The	degree	to	which	this	decades‐long	pattern	of	systemic	state	and	private	violence	is	implicated	
in	 the	 current	 crisis	 of	 violent	 crime	 within	 black	 communities	 is	 rarely	 discussed	 by	
criminologists,	 but	 it	 had	 two	major	 effects	 that	 have	 resonated	 to	 this	day.1	This	 specifically	
‘Southern’	reign	of	public	and	private	violence	and	repression	was	a	central	pillar	of	the	successful	
social	and	economic	subordination	of	African‐Americans	after	the	formal	end	of	slavery,	brutally	
enforcing	 harsh	 racial	 disparities	 in	 poverty	 and	 economic	 insecurity	 that,	 in	 the	 absence	 of	
national	 action	 on	 a	 scale	 sufficient	 to	 alter	 it,	 have	 been	 a	 defining	 feature	 of	 the	 African‐
American	experience,	North	and	South,	ever	since.	At	 the	same	time,	 it	arguably	provided	the	
template	 for	 the	 vast	 expansion	 of	 mass	 incarceration	 in	 America	 after	 the	 early	 1970s,	 by	
modeling	 the	 deployment	 of	 the	 justice	 system	 as	 a	 key	 mechanism	 of	 control	 of	 entire	
populations	rather	than	a	response	to	individual	criminality.	As	Douglas	Blackmon	(2009:	6)	puts	
it	in	his	stunning	history	of	the	‘re‐enslavement’	of	African	Americans	from	the	Civil	War	to	World	
War	II,	it	is	essential	to	acknowledge	the	‘effects	of	cycle	upon	cycle	of	malevolent	defeat,	of	the	
injury	of	seeing	one	generation	rise	above	poverty	only	to	be	indignantly	crushed,	of	the	impact	
of	repeating	tsunamis	of	violence	and	obliterated	opportunities	on	each	new	generation’.	
	
‘Southern’	resistance	also	limited	the	beneficial	impact	of	key	progressive	legislation	in	the	1930s	
that	established	much	of	America’s	still	fairly	rudimentary	system	of	public	social	supports	for	
working	people	and	the	deeply	disadvantaged.	The	resistance	of	Southern	employers	kept	most	
agricultural	and	domestic	workers	–	categories	that	at	the	time	included	a	majority	of	employed	
African‐Americans	 –	 out	 of	 the	 Social	 Security	 program	 for	 retirees	 and	 the	 unemployment	
insurance	 system	 for	 the	 jobless	 for	 decades.	 Similar	 pressure	 helped	 to	 keep	 other	 public	
assistance	benefits	abysmally	low,	because	of	the	fear	that	decent	benefits	would	cause	blacks	to	
spurn	work	at	rock‐bottom	wages	(Brown	1999;	Fox	2012),	again	helping	to	cement	enduring	
racial	differences	in	poverty	and	economic	insecurity	that	continue	to	shape	the	conditions	of	life	
in	black	communities.	
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Still	another	crucial	point	of	choice	came	at	the	end	of	World	War	II	when,	with	the	experience	of	
the	Great	Depression	still	fresh,	progressive	legislators	put	forward	a	visionary	proposal	for	full	
employment,	 which	 among	 other	 things	 committed	 the	 federal	 government	 to	 guaranteeing	
steady	work	to	everyone	who	wanted	a	job	(Currie	1976).	That	legislation	faced	fierce	and	largely	
successful	resistance	from	employers	and	their	representatives,	including	Southern	congressmen	
whose	constituents	often	relied	on	the	presence	of	a	 large	pool	of	precarious	and	 intimidated	
black	 workers.	 Had	 the	 bill	 passed	 in	 anything	 like	 its	 original	 form,	 post‐war	 economic	
development	 in	 the	 United	 States	 would	 have	 been	 radically	 transformed,	 as	 the	 gains	 from	
rapidly	growing	productivity	would	have	been	far	more	widely	and	equitably	shared.	Instead,	the	
tacit	encouragement	of	high	levels	of	joblessness,	coupled	with	the	precarious	condition	of	black	
workers	in	a	harshly	segregated	job	structure,	ensured	that	even	a	period	of	post‐war	prosperity	
was	marked	by	the	growing	economic	marginalization	of	many	black	Americans,	especially	the	
young,	and	by	the	‘hardening’	of	a	pattern	of	economic	expendability	and	social	abandonment.		
	
All	of	these	processes	were	compounded	by	a	somewhat	more	subtle	and	broadly	political	effect	
of	America’s	‘Southerness’.	The	relative	weakness	of	organized	labor	in	the	United	States	is	widely	
understood	to	be	an	important	part	of	the	explanation	for	the	distinctive	underdevelopment	of	
‘social‐democratic’	 policies	 in	 America	 versus	most	 other	 advanced	 Northern	 countries.	 That	
difference	affects	nearly	every	aspect	of	American	life,	from	the	lack	of	accessible	and	affordable	
health	care	to	elevated	rates	of	child	poverty	and,	not	least,	levels	of	violent	crime.	And	though	
the	sources	of	the	relative	weakness	of	the	American	labor	movement	are	complex,	one	part	of	
the	 explanation	 surely	 involves	 the	 historical	 ability	 of	 American	 employers	 and	white	 elites	
generally	to	weaken	class	solidarity	by	pitting	white	workers	against	black,	a	practice	that	was	a	
particularly	prominent	feature	of	the	post‐Civil	War	industrialization	of	the	American	South.	This	
has	 meant	 that	 the	 kinds	 of	 deep	 structural	 measures	 that	 might	 have	 alleviated	 the	
marginalization	 and	 dispossession	 of	 black	 Americans	 –	 adequate	 income	 support,	 universal	
medical	care,	an	inclusive	housing	policy,	a	commitment	to	full	employment	–	perennially	lacked	
a	strong	enough	constituency	to	make	real	headway,	even	 in	relatively	progressive	periods	 in	
recent	American	history.		
	
The	trajectory	of	marginality	and	violence	in	African‐American	communities	reflects	a	history	of	
crucial	opportunities	not	taken.	Reversing	that	trajectory	requires	facing	up	to	the	magnitude	of	
the	consequences	of	this	legacy,	and	advocating	for	social	policies	on	the	scale	and	depth	that	this	
history	 necessitates.	 Obviously,	 that	 is	 a	 formidable	 task	 and	 one	 that	 has	 been	 made	 more	
difficult	 by	 several	 adverse	 developments	 in	 the	 United	 States	 in	 recent	 years.	 One	 is	 the	
continuing	 shrinkage	of	 opportunities	 for	 steady	 and	 sustaining	work	 –	 the	product	 of	 global	
wage	competition,	 technological	 change,	 the	ongoing	decimation	of	public	 sector	employment	
and,	 especially	 since	 the	 recession	 of	 the	 early	 twenty‐first	 century,	 the	 reluctance	 of	 private	
employers	to	 invest	in	 job	creation.	Another	is	the	devastating	impact	of	mass	 incarceration	–	
again,	 in	 a	 real	 sense	 a	 ‘Southern’	 invention	 –	 which	 has	 compounded	 the	 problem	 of	 mass	
joblessness	and	sealed	 the	economic	redundancy	of	great	numbers	of	black	Americans.	And	a	
third	is	the	startling	rise	of	the	political	power	of	the	extreme	Right,	which,	not	coincidentally,	
draws	much	of	its	greatest	support	from	the	regional	heartland	of	the	traditional	South.	It	would	
be	difficult	to	overstate	how	much	the	national	shift	to	the	Right	has	contributed	to	the	continued	
precariousness	of	African‐American	lives,	both	by	imposing	harsh	austerity	measures	on	already	
reeling	 communities	 and,	 as	 importantly,	 by	 pushing	 crucially	 needed	 social	 and	 economic	
policies	off	the	political	agenda	of	both	major	political	parties.		
	
But	there	are	also	strongly	positive	developments	in	American	political	culture	that	could	shift	
the	political	balance	 in	ways	that	bode	well	 for	the	prospects	of	 finally	challenging	the	deeply	
entrenched	forces	that	contribute	to	endemic	violence	in	black	communities.	There	is	a	budding,	
if	still	fragmented,	movement	against	the	extremes	of	economic	inequality	and	heedless	austerity	
that	 we	 have	 encouraged	 in	 the	 twenty‐first	 century.	 There	 is	 a	 growing	 and	 remarkably	
nonpartisan	sentiment	in	favor	of	reining	in	the	worst	excesses	of	mass	incarceration	and	racially	
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targeted	 policing.	 And	 there	 is	 a	 much	 broader	 willingness,	 especially	 among	 the	 young,	 to	
confront	the	meaning	and	consequences	of	the	country’s	long	legacy	of	racial	oppression.	
	
None	 of	 this	 makes	 the	 task	 easy,	 because	 there	 are	 equally	 powerful	 forces	 working	 to	
perpetuate	 the	 conditions	 that	 undermine	 opportunity,	 dignity	 and	 security	 in	 many	 black	
communities.	I	think	we	have	to	acknowledge	the	hard	reality	that,	from	the	perspective	of	too	
many	of	 the	people	now	running	 the	economy	and	 the	polity	 in	 the	United	 States,	black	 lives	
actually	don’t	matter,	at	least,	not	all	black	lives,	and	not	very	much.	They	don’t	matter	very	much	
because	from	the	standpoint	of	the	imperatives	of	our	heedless	global	economy	they	are	relatively	
expendable.	 That	 is	why,	 for	 example,	we	 are	 quietly	willing	 to	 tolerate	 levels	 of	 black	 youth	
joblessness	that	virtually	guarantee	that	places	like	Gary	or	Baltimore	or	Detroit	will	continue	to	
have	the	homicide	numbers	they	do.	If	we	want	to	enduringly	end	the	routine	and	massive	loss	of	
black	lives	to	violence	–	and	for	that	matter	to	preventable	diseases	and	substance	abuse	and	all	
the	other	well‐known	and	exhaustively	catalogued	destroyers	of	black	 lives	–	we	will	have	 to	
challenge	those	imperatives.	
	
Whether	we	will	rise	to	that	challenge	is,	of	course,	an	open	question.	The	crisis	of	black	economic	
exclusion	and	expendability	is,	after	all,	hardly	a	new	problem.		
	
More	 than	a	 century	ago	 the	great	African‐American	 scholar	 and	activist	WEB	DuBois	 (1967)	
wrote	about	crime	and	race	in	Philadelphia,	the	city	where	he	conducted	one	of	the	first	really	
wide‐ranging	 empirical	 sociological	 studies	 ever	 done	 in	 the	 United	 States.	 DuBois	 fully	
acknowledged	that	the	problem	of	crime	in	Philadelphia’s	black	community	was	real	and	serious.	
But	he	also	insisted	that	it	was	fixable,	and	that	our	failure	to	fix	it	when	we	had	the	resources	to	
do	so	amounted	to	a	historic	default,	one	that	we	would	be	judged	for	in	the	future.	He	said:	
	
Other	centuries	looking	back	upon	the	culture	of	the	nineteenth	would	have	a	right	
to	suppose	that,	if	in	a	land	of	freemen,	eight	millions	of	human	beings	were	found	
to	be	dying	of	disease,	the	nation	would	cry	with	one	voice,	‘heal	them!’	if	they	were	
staggering	 on	 in	 ignorance,	 it	 would	 cry,	 ‘train	 them!’	 If	 they	 were	 harming	
themselves	and	others	by	crime,	it	would	cry,	‘guide	them!’.	
	
He	went	on	to	say	that	‘such	cries	are	heard	and	have	been	heard	in	the	land;	but	it	was	not	one	
voice’.	And	‘its	volume	has	ever	been	broken	by	counter‐cries	and	echoes;	“let	them	die!”	“train	
them	like	slaves!”	“let	them	stagger	downward!”’.	
	
DuBois	wrote	 those	words	 in	1899,	and	his	point	surely	rings	even	more	 true	more	 than	one	
hundred	years	later.	We	now	have	far	more	resources	at	our	disposal	to	train	and	to	heal,	and	we	
have	learned	a	lot	more,	since	DuBois	wrote,	about	what	has	gone	wrong	and	what	needs	to	be	
done.	We	can	and	do	argue	about	specifics:	about	what	kinds	of	social	investments	would	give	us	
the	 most	 return;	 about	 which	 toxic	 policies	 that	 now	 contribute	 to	 the	 ongoing	 social	 and	
economic	impoverishment	of	black	communities	most	need	changing.	But	no	one	who	has	been	
paying	attention	can	seriously	claim	that	we	don’t	broadly	understand	some	things	we	can	do	that	
would	make	a	very	substantial	difference	in	the	prospects	of	those	communities	and	hence	in	the	
level	of	violence,	fear	and	grief	that	they	now	suffer.		
	
DuBois	put	 it	 this	way	back	at	 the	 close	of	 the	nineteenth	century:	he	acknowledged	 that	 the	
problems	were	‘difficult,	extremely	difficult’.	But	he	insisted	that	‘they	are	such	as	the	world	has	
conquered	before	and	can	conquer	again’.	And	taking	them	on	was	not	just	a	matter	of	altruism,	
but	a	‘battle	for	humanity	and	human	culture’.	He	said:	
	
If	 in	the	heyday	of	 the	greatest	of	 the	world’s	civilizations,	 it	 is	possible	 for	one	
people	…	[to]	slowly	murder	[another]	by	economic	and	social	exclusion	until	they	
disappear	 from	 the	 face	 of	 the	 earth	 –	 if	 the	 consummation	of	 such	 a	 crime	be	
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possible	in	the	twentieth	century,	then	our	civilization	is	vain	and	the	republic	is	a	
mockery	and	a	farce.	(DuBois	1967:	388)	
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1	The	distinctive	pattern	of	private	and	official	violence	in	the	American	South	also	probably	had	a	shaping	influence	
on	 the	overall	American	pattern	of	gun	ownership	and	gun	violence,	which	also	sharply	distinguishes	 the	United	
States	from	other	‘Northern’	nations.	That	connection	is	sufficiently	complex	to	require	a	treatment	of	its	own.	
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